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Abstract 
 
which have shaped both the field of Baconian studies and the larger domain of early modern philosophy and early modern 
science. I especially address the issue of their persistence despite repeated refutations and I claim that they can give us an 
interesting overview of the signposts and strong presuppositions which have survived throughout the changing tides of recent 
historiography of science. 
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1. Introduction 
As has been often remarked, Francis Bacon has a singular place amongst the early modern thinkers in more 
ways than one. He was praised and vilified, in turns, often for the very same achievements that some scholars 
completely failed to see in his works. William Wheeler called him he modern 
1], Condorcet praised him for discovering the  [2] while 
David Brewster, Jutsus Liebig and Augustus de Morgan agreed that no modern scientific discovery was ever 
achieved by the scientific method advocated by Bacon [3,4]. In the twentieth century, t
llaborative and communitarian view of science 
the scientific method. Bacon was in turn praised and vilified for these 
achievements by the friends and critiques of Science, respectively [5]. Meanwhile, an increasingly significant 
number of researchers denied him any contribution to the emergence of modern science. He was said to have 
7 8], to have a negligible role in the 
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scientific revolution. This is how the historian of science, Alexandre Koyre, has summed up the situation in the 
following manner: 
 is a joke, and a bad one at that, that one can still find in the text books. In fact Bacon understood 
nothing about science. He was credulous and completely uncritical. His manner of thinking was closer to alchemy and magic (he believed in 
tic  [9]. 
often told that it 
1]. These criticisms were formulated both by historians such as Koyre and Dijksterhis, as well as by 
philosophers of science such as Popper and his students. Meanwhile, other historians and philosophers of science, 
] 
largely original and, as far as ]. This dichotomy of evaluation extended beyond 
the issue of the scientific method and the origins of science, into more particular aspects of 
while, at the same time, Baconian 
experimentalism was denounced as a myth [13, 14].  logic of 
] and the author of a spectacular failure in both logic and metaphysics [14]. To sum up, both the 
personal and the scientific reputation of Francis Bacon varied tremendously from one historical period to the 
other, forever tossed on the waves of changing historiographical currents. Summing up years of research 
dedicated to the reception of Bac  Penrose concluded: 
Few philosophers have suffered greater variation in the reputation which has been theirs throughout the history of modern philosophy than 
has Francis Bacon. Carried by eighteenth century thought to a commanding position as the greatest, the most universal, and the most 
 he was plunged in the nineteenth century to the despicable status of a man whose scientific method was never used 
by any real scientist, whose effect upon the advancement of science was, if anything, detrimental. From one point of view he was the first 
really great modern moralist; from another he was a contemptible schemer whose ethical advice had best been left unpublished. He was a 
staunch adherent of the Christian faith, who strengthened the hold of religion on the hearts of men; and he was a damnable atheist whose 
every effort was aimed at undermining all religion. He was personally a man of stainless character who was sacrificed for the misdeeds of 
others; and he was a treacherous designer, corrupt, im  He wrote beautiful English and admirable Latin; and 
his English style was stiff and ped  The only philosopher who could come close to being favourably compared 
to him was Aristotle, or Plato; and yet there were few men in the history of philosophy who had made greater contribution to knowledge than 
had Bacon  [15].  
2. Changing tides of historiography and the Baconian barometer 
The above overview of conflicting views on Bacon and his philosophy was written in 1932.  It did not cease to 
ring true for the past 40 years. Quite on the contrary; changing tides in the historiography of science had 
 As it has 
urprising frequency [5, 6] to fit the current 
questions in the philosophy of science and the current historiography of the Scientific Revolution. Philosophers 
of science interested in the scientific method have often 
from his works) in the internecine philosophical wars over the logic of discovery, justification, induction and the 
hypothetico-
as the simple-minded precursor of the logical positivist -paradigmatic thinker 
tinkering with fact-gathering activities with no relevance whatsoever for the Scientific Revolution [16]. When the 
scientific method ceased to play the central role on the stage of philosophical wars, the friends of discovery saw 
in Bacon a precursor of more elaborated forms of logic of discovery, problem-solving activities and heuristics 
[17]. The new experimentalism appropriated him as the first philosopher of experiment [12]. Various 
historiographical currents in the sociology of science borrowed Baconian phrases and pointed to Baconian terms 
in order to expose the imperialism [18, 19], non-sustainable development  [18, 19, 20, 
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21], anti-feminism [22, 23] etc. of the new science. This is partly the reason why Brian Vickers has claimed that 
can act as a barometer of the state of knowledge at any one time ]. 
Meanwhile, the changing tides of historiography are not sufficient to explain some important and common 
 in seeing Bacon as both 
 (in very general terms, usually relating to science communication, ideology etc.) and completely 
not-relevant for the emergence of modern science [5] 
critico-philosophical blindness  [5]. This is also curiously doubled by what has been sometimes labelled as a 
  [5, see also 6]. Relatively little has been done so far to explain such general 
tendencies. They were usually simply ascribed to the problems, types of questions, prejudices and idols 
dominating a particular discipline, time-period or state of knowledge.  As Paolo Rossi has brilliantly summed it 
up, this problem can be given a thorough Baconian reading. 
to now been 
able to eradicate are undoubtedly following: the propensity not to read the original texts; the tendency to neglect all that happens outside our 
specialist community; the tendency to reduce the philosophies of the past to some seemingly brilliant slogans; the construction on these bases 
of mythical philosophical portraits  [6]. 
It is not, however, some such idols that are of concern in the present paper. My investigation will rather bear 
on a different level. I intend to explore a common core of particular and recurrent prejudices present in the large 
the form of evaluative judgments of high generality, often covering the whole ensemble of Baconian works. They 
are simple, easy to gras
remarkably persistent to the changing tides of historiography. I will call them the idols of Baconian scholarship. 
3. The four idols of Baconian scholarship 
There are at least four idols of Baconian scholarship. The first of them is powerful, deeply entrenched and 
almost co-extensive with modern science. It is the claim that Bacon disliked and distrusted mathematics. 
Although articulated in the writings of Burtt, Butterfield, Dijksterhuis and Koyre, t  origin goes all the 
way back to the seventeenth-century. 
 
It was a misfortune to the world that my Lord Bacon was not skilled in mathematics, which made him jealous of their assistance in natural 
enquiries; when the operations of nature shall be followed up to their static (and mechanical) causes, the use of induction will cease, and 
syllogism succeed in the place of it  [25]. 
 
In a seminal article, Kuhn formulates a similar evaluative judgment and raises it at the rank of methodological 
principle.  
Those critics who ridicule him [Bacon] for failing to recognize the best science of his day have missed the point. He did not reject 
Copernicanism because he preferred the Ptolemaic system. Rather, he rejected both because he thought that no system so complex, abstract, 
and mathematical could contribute either the understanding or the control of Nature  [16]. 
ion to mathematical astronomy as a more profound divide between two views 
on the exploration of nature: the age-old tradition of mathematical sciences (mixed mathematics) and the natural 
honest empirical exploration of nature.  
This alleged 
deeply entrenched in the receive  based on essentialist 
historiographical presuppositions. It not only assumes deep-level presuppositions on the nature of science, but it 
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-temporal essentialist nature, disregarding completely the historical character and 
evolution of mathematical knowledge, mathematical disciplines and mathematical sources and authorities in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Moreover, it flies in the face of substantial historical and interpretative 
counter-evidence, such as concerns for the proper place of pure mathematics in his tree of science [26], 
his plans to develop two natural histories of mathematics [27], and it makes it rather difficult to interpret 
numerous claims about tics of physics begets practice 27]. Such is, however, the 
particular quality of idols, that the light of truth does not dispel their power. They are deeply entrenched in the 
hu derable amount of continuous work and attention. This is 
why this first and oldest idol of Baconian scholarship was not yet dispelled, despite the precise, clear and 
convincing demonstration made by Graham Rees and Antonio Perez Ramos in a couple of seminal articles 
philosophy [28, 29, 30]. Repeated refutations came from different quarters of Baconian scholarship. On one 
hand, Rees has explored the quanti
28
the reformation of astronomy can also unveil the important role mathematics and measurement are called to play 
in the development of a natural history of the heavens [30, 31]. Recent researches on the evolution and changing 
 [32, 33], on the changing borders between practical and theoretical mathematics at 
the end of the sixteenth-century [33, 34, 35, 36] will most probably become powerful allies in fighting this first 
idol of Baconian scholarship. A contextual reconstruction of Baconian views on mathematics awaits to be 
written. 
The second idol of Ba
seemingly experimental part is based on speculative thinking. In other words, Bacon borrowed ready-made 
observations and experimental reports from his less philosophically minded contemporaries. He then found a 
clever way of writing them, such that they became accessible to the curious gentlemen and dilettanti. He pictured 
an exciting picture of experimental activity which, in turn, was subsequently used to promote the idea of 
experimental science. But he was not engaged in actual experimental practice and he understood little about 
devising and using experiments. This second idol originates in a particular idiosyncratic reception of Bacon in the 
nineteenth century by a reputed chemist and experimental scientist Justus Liebig [37]. It is an idol of the cave: 
Liebig clearly brought in his interpretation of Bacon a personal belief in the natural division of humankind into 
dilettanti. He also displayed a very idiosyncratic dislike of the second category, in 
which he included most of the early modern philosophers. And he saw Bacon as the manipulating mind behind 
the general tendency to impose the opinions of the dilettanti onto the hard working men of science [37]. He 
 Liebig views were simply repeated by 
many twentieth century scholars who simply claimed that Bacon has never contributed anything solid to the 
growth of experimental knowledge. For example, historian of science Lynn Thorndike claimed that Bacon was a 
38] talking 
]. More recently, Michel Malherbe completely disentangled 
the seventeenth-century Baconian experimental philosophy of the early Royal Society from any reading of Bacon 
and claimed that it was a purely ideological import motivated by the anti-Hobbesian programme of Robert Boyle 
and his colleagues [14].  In contrast, Bacon did not do experiments.  
not only that Bacon read about, critically reflected and discussed, reproduced and improved and sometimes 
invented a large variety of experiments and experimental practices [39, 40, 41, 42, 43]; he repeatedly wrote about 
experimental knowledge ] from one experimental set-up to another [40, 
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41, 42]. He constantly reflected upon the best ways to experiment and showed interest in teaching not results, but 
experimental practices, methods and heuristics. His posthumous Sylva Sylvarum (1626) is littered with quite 
sophisticated methodological considerations and precise (even if, sometimes, pithy) descriptions of experimental 
set-ups. In conclusion, there are numerous counter-examples in both primary and secondary literature to convince 
us that this second idol of Baconian scholarship stands on very unsure feet. It mainly stands because the way in 
which Bacon wrote about experiments is very unfamiliar to the modern mind. His followers knew, however, 
better than that. 
regulating experiment abound in both England and France in the second part of the seventeenth century.   
This third idol of Baconian scholarship is the more insidious and probably it will be the most difficult to expel. 
It claims that Baconian science was explicitly opposing any form of mathematizing nature; that for Bacon the 
language of nature was not mathematics. He saw nature as a labyrinth and the explorer of nature as a hunter. Not 
only did Bacon pursue an enterprise of an entirely different nature than the early modern mechanical philosophy; 
his language was different. He aimed at an interpretation of nature and described it in terms which had nothing in 
common with mathematics.  Although discussing mathematics again, this idol is very different from the first one 
discussed above. It addresses not the nature of mathematics and mathematical knowledge but the relation 
between disciplines, and claims that nceiving nature prevented him from even addressing the 
kind of problems associated with the emergence of modern science. He simply belonged to a different tradition, 
be that of hermeticism [45], of natural magic, the tradition of the books of secrets [23,46], the Calvinist or Mosaic 
physics of mid sixteenth-century [47, 48, 49], or perhaps a humanist and rhetorical tradition of reading nature 
[50, 51, 52, 53] etc. The multiplication of contexts and suggestions should not obscure, however, the fundamental 
common root of this idol, ultimately relating to the same essentialist view on mathematics so common amongst 
the proponents of the Scientific Revolution. In its more crude form of expression, this idol is instantiated in 
simply stating that Bacon had the misfortune to live before Newton and did not pay the proper attention to the 
mathematical developments of Kepler, Stevin and Galileo. In a less crude form of instantiation, this idol is 
responsible for thousands of pages of debates concerning the true meaning of interpretatio, the relation between 
reading Nature and reading Scriptures, Bacon and religion etc. Since for Bacon the language of nature was not 
Recent works by Guido 
Giglioni, Rhodri Lewis [51], Koen Vermeir [54], Sorana Corneanu [54, 55] etc. have questioned some of the 
important contextual reconstructi
 all simply necessary 
prerequisites for any attempt to re alphabet of nature.  They have drawn attention 
to Baconian writings less known to the historians of early modern method or to the philosophers of experiment. 
Sophie Weeks [56, 57], Silvia Manzo [58] and Guido Giglioni [52, 53, 59] did quite a lot to clarify Bac
  and have drawn attention to 
the sophisticated metaphysics and epistemology behind the misleading term interpretatio naturae. All such 
developments have proven at least how much there is still to be done once we refuse to give in to this third idol of 
Baconian scholarship.  
The fourth idol of Baconian scholarship is an idol of the theatre. It states that Bacon rejected the physico-
mathematics and mechanics of Galileo and his precursors, and promoted a purely qualitative physics. He was not 
interested in quantitative aspects and measurement but preferred the language of elements, appetites and the 
qualities borrowed from Telesio and other such novelists. He was simply ignoring the science 
of his day. In Whitehead words: 
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In this respect Bacon completely missed the tonality which lay behind the success of seventeenth-century science. Science was becoming, 
and has remained, primarily quantitative. Search for measurable elements among your phenomena, and then search for relations between 
these measures of physical quantities. Bacon ignores this rule of science [ ] he gives no hint that there should be a search for quantities. 
Perhaps he was misled by the current logical doctrines which had come down from Aristotle. For, in effect, these doctrines said to the 
physicist classify when they should have said measure  [5]. 
One is quite surprised by the persistence with which historians and philosophers repeat claims which fly in the 
face of historical facts and documents. Such is, for example, the deep-rooted mistaken belief that Bacon was not 
 [60] and Antonio Perez Ramos 
[2, 61] showing that Bacon read both published and unpublished works by Galileo, aimed to establish a 
scholarship is still very much in place.  In a paper reflecting on the Victorian reception and image of Bacon, Lisa 
Jardine and Alan Stewart have shown how the romantic image of a singular genius lead James Spedding
Victorian editor and biographer, to make certain biased editorial choices and often simply did not include in his 
edition of Ba
scientific contemporaries [62]
contemporaries [44, 63 interactions with mechanics and 
mathematicians through his duties in the Office of Patents and his more general interest in getting in touch with 
 He has also contributed to in-depth 
s experimentation [44]. Much still needs to be done both in terms of 
works, the late and posthumous natural histories [49, 65, 66, 67] .  Peter Anstey and Michael Hunter have shown 
the influence of what they call the Baconian method of natural history amongst the members of the early Royal 
Society [64, 65]. However, much is still to be done in order to disentangle the various forms and different 
,
idol of Baconian scholarship is properly dispelled and exorcised.  
4. The first vintage 
What do we gain if we simply discard for a moment the four idols of Baconian scholarship? If we try to forget 
the current prejudices according to which Bacon disliked mathematics? If we reconsider the view that for Bacon 
nature is a labyrinth which has to be the subject of qualitative and tentative (trial-and-error) investigations? If we 
question that he did not do experiments and that he was opposed to the tradition of mixed mathematics? A fresh 
new look at Bac
interesting insights into a quite sophisticated version of a carefully methodized, precisely measured and 
sometimes highly theoretical early version of the exploration of nature [39, 40, 48]. 
I suggest that the first vintage of this fight against idols lies in what was partially done in the past ten years, 
 [49, 65, 67]. After being buried for three hundred years 
 From the relatively little that 
has been done so far it is already clear that this is a very promising field for historians and philosophers alike. 
The second revaluati
pure and mixed). 
With all these changes, and freed from the last traces of historiographical essentialism, regarding mathematics, 
philosophy and religion, the historian of science/philosophy can at last begin to read Bacon with the same 
instruments which have recently produced major revaluations in the fields of Cartesian and Newtonian studies. 
and natural historical writings numerous arguments and illustrations of interesting precursors to current questions 
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regarding exploratory experimentation, experimental research strategies, background knowledge, probabilistic 
logic of discovery, pattern recognition and much, much more. 
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